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In some respects, it is extremely un- 
fortunate that names are ever attached 
either to ideas or objects. The false 
attachment of names to ideas or objects 
similar but not identical with the original 
can work harm far exceeding the benefits 
conferred by having a convenient label. 
The name "species" has come to such a 
state. 
As we shall see, a species, be it plant 
or animal, is a fiction, a mental construct 
without objective existence. Animal, and 
plant, lines of descent exist in a four-di- 
mensional continuum. To set up species 
in this continuous line of descent, we must 
chop it into units, and in any such process 
the divisions are purely arbitrary. Avail- 
able information makes such a view more 
or less self-evident. What, then, is a 
"species"? Instead of starting with an 
evolutionary line and dealing with it on 
the basis of preconceived concepts, work- 
ing from the top down, so to speak, let 
us work from the bottom tip. 
Our starting point will be an individual 
animal, which for convenience we will say 
answers to the name of John. John is a 
sexually-reproducing animal. As such, 
he comes into existence at the moment that 
certain sperm and egg nuclei fuse, at which 
moment we may refer to him as Johno, 
one cell with a nucleus. The next time 
we look for Johno, we can't find him. In 
his place, we find a stranger with two cells. 
Ah-ha, we say, John has undergone cell- 
division. We are confident that if we 
had observed Johno we would have seen 
his continuous transformation into this 
two-celled stranger who is obviously not 
Johno. Since we are sure he does have 
some sort of a very close relation to Johno, 
we decide to call this new animal John,. 
Similarly we find John1 displaced by 
John2 and he by John3, 4, 5, .. .. Thus we 
have followed what is usually called the 
"growing-up," or the ontogeny of an 
individual. But what is John? Obvi- 
ously, he is not the same thing at any two 
successive instants. Now he is John1324; 
the next instant he is John1325, forever and 
irrevocably different from any John that 
has come before or from any that will 
come in the future. Thus Johnl is a suc- 
cession of conformations of matter in 
time, and any meaningful study of him 
will have to consider the four-dimensional 
JohnO+1+2+3+4+ * * * z 
One fine spring day the tender pas- 
sion stirs John,,'s breast, and he looks 
around for a mate. Withinl his immedi- 
ate horizon he espies Janen+i, Joann+2 
and June?+3. For reasons too devious to 
explore at this time, Johnn+4 chooses 
J ane,+5 for his mate, or perhaps, vice- 
versa. Thus we pass from the individual 
to the breeding population, our next 
meaningful unit. 
What precisely is a breeding popula- 
tion? From John's point of view, it in- 
cludes all females with whom he might 
ordinarily mate; in other words, it takes 
in a territory extending from a central 
point out to the limits of John's wander- 
ings. Such a territory includes males 
who would be equally glad to mate with 
the females of this same area. The total 
population of males and females ready, 
willing, and able to interbreed and cen- 
tered around a particular anlimal we may 
denote a breeding population. Each in- 
dividual in this population will also be 
the center of another breeding popula- 
tion, most of which will have territories 
extending beyond the original one. The 
character of a given breeding population 
is never identical at any two moments. 
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The individuals in it are constantly clhang- 
ing in character. New animals are con- 
stantly added by birth and immigration 
and others are lost by death and emii- 
gration. Furthermliore, as the central 
animal travels, his breeding population 
shifts also in geographic position, adding 
and subtracting animals from the poptu- 
lation in so doing. 
Since we have defined the breeding pop- 
ulation as comprising those females with 
which John will mate (or would if he 
had time and opportunity) and the males 
which can mate with them, it follows that 
the breeding population is characterized 
by a genetical continuity and similarity, 
fluid and shifting, but unmistakable. 
Naturally, the elemnents of this popula- 
tion will not be genetically idlentical, even 
apart from sex differences. No natural 
population is. But the germ plasms of 
John,, and Jane,, and/or Joann and/or 
June, are similar and compatible at least 
to the extent that they produce viable and 
fertile offspring, thus insuring the con- 
tinuity of the population. Thus we have a 
moderately definable, natural, biological 
unit composed of animals which in nature 
will interbreed as the opportunity pre- 
sents. 
From John to Jane to breeding popu- 
lation we have a certain biological con- 
tinuum, the individuals of the breeding 
population being connected, figuratively, 
by strands of germ plasm which represent 
this continuity. When we try to deal with 
larger aggregates of individuals, our cate- 
gories become more and more abstract and 
empty of any real meaning. Our basic 
taxoniomic unit is, of course, the subspe- 
cies. The best description available of a 
subspecies seems to be that it is a geo- 
graphically (or ecologically) isolated sub- 
division of a species. This says little 
enough. From our point of view, a sub- 
species would be a geographically con- 
fined aggregate of breeding populations. 
What, then, is a species? It would 
seem thus far to be the whole of any one 
series of breeding populations. This is 
certainly an innocuous-seeming defini- 
tion, but is it ? The definition- as it stands 
unfortunately puts all living and fossil ani- 
mals in one species, since there is a con- 
tinuity of germ-plasnm back from John to 
the original primordial cell, and from it 
forward to every living animal (not to 
mention plant). Thus, if we ignore time, 
we end up with only one species, which 
is all to the good insofar as it emphasizes 
the unity of life and the Brotherhood of 
Man, but is of little use to the practicing 
taxonomist. 
Can we avoid the temporal difficulty? 
Let us redefine the species as the whole 
of any one series of breeding populations 
as it exists at any one time. This defini- 
tioln mlerely lands us in an exactly op- 
posite difficulty, for we now have an infin- 
ity of species, time being infinitely divis- 
ible. Both these definitions of species at 
least have the advantage of being as ob- 
jective as possible, but if we try to keep 
the definition of a species objective and 
still useful, we are forced to bring into the 
definition a discrete unit of time. As soon 
as we do this, we are, of course, being 
arbitrary, and perhaps not a little ridicu- 
lous. If we shouild define a species as the 
whole of any one series of breeding pop- 
ulations in existence over a period of 10,- 
000 years, who is to say as to when the 
year zero is to be? Further, insofar as 
paleontology is concerned, no absolute 
time scale of usable "fineness" and pre- 
cision is obtainable, and no cognizance is 
taken of differing evolutionary rates. 
Thus, we come back to our original 
contention, that "species" have only a 
subjective existence. Our real biological 
unit is the breeding population, since it 
is through this ever-changing unit that 
the germ-plasm is passed. Taxonomy 
takes no notice of the breeding popula- 
tion, but any permanently useful tax- 
onomuic systemn must take account of its 
existence and its significance. Species and 
subspecies are the units with which the 
taxonomiist deals, but they are merely 
convenient labels for arbitrary groupings 
and have only a minimum of biological 
meaning. 
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The question whether or not species 
have objective reality is a perennial one. 
If a species were merely "a fiction, a 
mental construct without objective exist- 
ence" one would expect under all circum- 
stances the borderline between species 
to be exceedingly vague and subjective. 
However, if Dr. Burma should make an 
excursion into the neighborhood of his 
home town, he will find that every species 
of birds and mammals is sharply separated 
from every other one. This is not an ex- 
ceptional situation; in fact it is the condi- 
tionl naturalists find in every part of the 
world. The primitive Papuani of the 
mountains of New Guinea recognizes as 
species exactly the same natural units 
that are called species by the museum 
ornithologist (Mayr, 1946). The ar- 
rangement of organic life into well-de- 
fined units is universal, and it is this 
striking discontinuity between local popu- 
lations which impressed the naturalists 
Ray and Linnaeus and led to the develop- 
ment of the species concept. There can 
be no argument as to the objective reality 
of the gaps between local species in sexu- 
ally reproducing organisms. 
An excursion into the field of semantics 
appears helpful at this point. There are 
concepts that are absolute, like stone or 
fire, and others that are relative. If I 
meet an unknown man I do not know 
whether or not he is a brother. He is a 
brother only in relation to another per- 
son (a brother or sister of his). The 
word species likewise is such a relational 
term. It separates interbreeding popula- 
tions from all others. In fact, the word 
species is most meaningful in connection 
with populations that are not conspecific, 
populations that are separated by a re- 
productive gap. 
It has been pointed out (Burma, above) 
that it is virtually impossible to delimit a 
breeding population. Though manly in- 
dividuals are obviously members of a 
single effective, local breeding population, 
there are other individuals, more distant 
in space and time, wxhich might possibly 
belong to different populations of the 
same species. It is n-ot possible to under- 
take a clearcut delimlitation of one breed- 
ing population of a species against others. 
This is no major tragedy at this point 
since we are not discussing the delimita- 
tion of breeding populations. What is 
important is the fact that there is no 
difficulty in delimiting a breeding poptula- 
tion of one species against a sympatric- 
synchronous breeding population of other 
species. The gap between such species is 
well defined and has objective reality. 
The presence or absence of a reproduc- 
tive gap can be tested only where popu- 
lations are in contact. The species thus 
has full objective reality only in a local 
fauna or flora. This non-dimensional 
species (Mayr, l.c.) is the standard of the 
species concept as originally conceived by 
Ray and Linnaeus. The objective reality 
of this species is beyond doubt. 
To repeat once more, the essence of 
the species concept is the non-interbreed- 
ing of a population with other populations, 
a phenomenon which can be tested only 
where such populations are in contact. 
No matter how different certain individ- 
uals might be (polymorphs, larval stages, 
etc.), as soon as it is established that they 
are members of a single breeding popula- 
tion, they are considered conspecific. 
The difficulties which Dr. Burma sees 
are not those of the original, non-dimen- 
sional species concept. Rather they are 
due to an expansion of this species con- 
cept in space and timie. All species are 
subject to evolutionary change since, as 
Dobzhansky stated so truly, the species is 
merely a stage in an evolutionary process. 
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It is implicit in the theory of evolution 
that species should change in space and in 
time. There should be populations in an 
evolutionary series which are on the 
borderline between- an ancestral and a 
daughter species. But even such a bor- 
derline population is as good a species in 
relation to others with which it is iTt con- 
tact as any lnormal species. 
The difficulties to the practical appli- 
cation of the species concept caused by 
evolutioni are more apparent than real. 
There are gaps even in a multidimensional 
system. These gaps, as far as paleontolo- 
gists are concerned, are caused by the ex- 
treme scantiness of the fossil record. The 
number of well described transformations 
of one species into another one is actu- 
ally very small. Usually there is either 
a sequence of sharply discontinuous spe- 
cies as with the Eocene oysters of Texas 
(Stenzel, 1949) or else the sequence con- 
sists of slight subspecies, with even the ex- 
tremes not yet having reached full species 
level. The fact that species are the prod- 
uct of evolution and continue to evolve 
seems only rarely to become a source of 
practical difficulties for paleontologists. 
In the majority of the cases the working 
paleontologist is dealing with a non-di- 
mensional situation (as described above). 
In a single horizon at a single locality the 
species of the paleontologist are as well 
defined as are those of the local naturalist. 
Whenever a paleontologist runs into diffi- 
culties in such a non-dimensional system, 
it is not due to the weakness of the spe- 
cies concept but rather due to difficulties 
of taxonomic analysis (polymorphism, 
ecophenotypes, age variation, etc.). 
The species concept has n-ot only its 
greatest objective reality in a non-dimen- 
sional system, but also its greatest useful- 
ness. In a sympatric-synlchronous situa- 
tion there is niothing initermediate between 
breeding populationis and species. If a 
paleontologist studies a series of speci- 
mens from a given horizon, he knows that 
they are all either members of a single spe- 
cies or of different species. By definition 
there canl be no intermediate stages in 
such a collection as, for example, sub- 
species. The species concept not only 
permits but actually demands an une- 
quivocal decision. The species to be de- 
limited in such cases by the practical 
taxonomist is by no means "a mental con- 
struct without objective existence," as 
claimed by Dr. Burma. 
In all multidimensional situations an in- 
ference has to be made (Simpson, 1943) 
on the basis of the objective species of the- 
non-dimensional system. The subjectiv- 
ity of this expanded species concept by no 
means invalidates the species concept per 
se. The species of the local naturalist or 
of the paleontologist within a given hori- 
zon is clearly delimited against other spe- 
cies and can thus be considered as having 
objective reality. 
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POSTSCRIPTUM 
BENJAMIN H. BURMA 
At first glance it will seem that Dr. 
Mayr and I are indeed far apart in our 
conception of species. However, I be- 
lieve that a close reading will show that 
our positions are actually not so very dif- 
ferent after all. The neozoologist is usu- 
ally impressed by the distinctness of the 
"species" he sees in the world today. 
On the other hand, the paleontologist is 
more likely to be impressed by the con- 
tinuity of a given evolutionary line. Dr. 
Mayr's criticisms, I believe, do not actu- 
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ally attack the fundamental basis of my 
argument, the complete subjectivity of 
the concept of "species" when viewed in a 
four-dimensional space-time rather than 
in the unreal three-dimensional space of 
static time. They do focus attention on 
the practical utility of species as tused by 
the neozoologist. 
I cannot, however, agree that pale- 
ontologists are so uniformly impressed 
by the objective reality of species. It is 
true that in the past paleontologists seemed 
to have been little troubled by this. On 
the other hand, it is well to remember 
that many of the paleontologic species of 
fifty years ago are the genera and sub- 
genera of today. The paleontologist of 
today finds it more and more difficult to 
recognize valid differences between the 
"species" of a given phyletic line as col- 
lecting and study become more thorough. 
It is this practical and growing difficulty 
which prompted my foregoing analysis of 
the species concept. 
